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From Widmar to Mergens: The Winding
Road of First Amendment Analysis
By ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE*
Introduction
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Widmar v. Vincent, holding
that a state university that created a "limited open forum" by opening its
facilities to student organizations must grant equal access to religiously
affiliated groups. The university's failure to do so constituted content-
based discrimination that violated the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution.2 The Court rejected the university's argument that
its policy to disallow religious meetings on campus was implemented to
avoid contravening establishment clause principles.' The Court's opin-
ion was inconclusive as to whether the Widmar rationale would apply to
secondary schools.
During the same period, Congress and state legislatures mounted
numerous efforts to permit prayer in public schools. As the political de-
bate over school prayer raged on, moderate forces in Congress seized
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., 1967, Brooklyn College;
M.A., 1969, Hunter College; Ph.D., 1976, Columbia University; J.D., 1980, Brooklyn Law
School; LL.M., 1984, Columbia University. This Article is based on research supported by
grants from the National Institute of Education Law and Government Program (Grant No.
605-7130-2), the Spencer Foundation, and the Faculty Research Program at St. John's Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, the Court held that the University of Missouri at
Kansas City's policy prohibiting the use of university buildings or grounds "for purposes of
religious worship or religious teaching," while permitting such use by other groups, violated
the students' free speech rights under the First Amendment. Id at 265. Having created a
"limited open forum," the university could not exclude speech based on its religious content
absent a compelling state interest. The Court further held that an "equal access" policy in this
setting would not violate the Establishment Clause. Id at 275-76.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states in part: "Congress shall make
no law... abridging the freedom of speech...." This is commonly known as the Free Speech
Clause. The First Amendment applies to the states by incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment clauses include the Religion Clauses,
which state that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.. . ." These are commonly referred to as the Establish-
ment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause respectively.
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upon the "equal access" concept of Widmar as a reasonable compromise.
Thus, in 1984, Congress enacted the Equal Access Act,4 which applied
the Widmar doctrine to the secondary school setting. The Equal Access
Act was a bipartisan legislative attempt to provide legal protection for
student-initiated religious speech while avoiding the constitutional pit-
falls of school-sponsored prayer. The ambiguous language and legislative
history of the Equal Access Act, however, left school districts confused
about the intricacies of applying the Act's provisions to a particular edu-
cational context.
The Supreme Court attempted to define the Equal Access Act's pa-
rameters and lay to rest the constitutional concerns raised by the stat-
ute's opponents in Board of Education v. Mergens.5 The Court faced a
multifaceted constitutional dilemma interpreting the Equal Access Act in
the context of the Mergens facts. The Mergens Court strained to uphold
a congressional enactment derived from heated controversy, tough nego-
tiation, and ultimate compromise that left a legislative history rife with
internal contradictions and ambiguities.
Mergens, as Widmar, further set the Court to balancing the conflict-
ing values underlying the Free Speech and Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment. But the Court's membership, ideology, and constitutional
doctrine had evolved during the years between Widmar and Mergens.
The Justices in Mergens faced the tasks of (1) weaving together free
speech and religion clause developments and (2) reconciling the inconsis-
tencies between the Court's expressed views in more recent secondary
school cases and those expressed in the past.
Two freedom of expression cases played a key role in the various
Mergens opinions, in addition to a line of establishment clause decisions
6
dating from the mid-1980s. In the first case, Tinker v. Des Moines In-
4. Equal Access Act of 1984, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1989). The Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportu-
nity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within
that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other
content of the speech at such meetings.
Id § 4071(a). The Equal Access Act of 1984 will be referred to herein as the Equal Access
Act or the Act.
5. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). For the first time, the Court in Mergens directly addressed the
constitutionality of the Equal Access Act. The Court had dismissed an earlier case on proce-
dural grounds. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986). In Bender,
however, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist would have upheld
the Act as constitutional. Id. at 551 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id at 555 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
6. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989); Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
dependent Community School District,7 the Court recognized broad con-
stitutional rights for secondary school students. In the second case,
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,8 the Court seemingly signaled a
retreat from Tinker; the holding, however, may have been based on fac-
tual distinctions.
On a practical level, Mergens successfully provides school officials
with guidelines for implementing the Equal Access Act. On a theoretical
level, the case reaffirms the Court's development of a more constrained
perspective as to its role vis-A-vis the legislative branch. When we
scratch beneath the surface and examine the reasoning underlying the
several opinions generated by the case, several problems emerge. The
most obvious of these is the Justices' failure to reach a consensus on es-
tablishment clause doctrine. While a majority of the Justices have
adopted Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test" spin on Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,9 Justices Kennedy and Scalia have blatantly criticized and rejected
Justice O'Connor's approach in favor of their own analysis. More funda-
mentally, Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Mergens applies both
establishment clause and free speech clause principles in a manner incon-
sistent with the Court's prior views on public education, free speech
rights, and the limits of local school discretion. This Article discusses
7. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In Tinker, the Court upheld the right of students to wear arm-
bands protesting the Vietnam War as an exercise of symbolic speech protected under the First
Amendment.
8. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). In Hazelwood, the Court held that secondary school officials
could delete articles from a school newspaper when they had not created a public forum, and
so long as their actions were "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns." Id. at
273.
9. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court articulated a three-part test for addressing
establishment clause challenges. First, "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose";
second, "its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits reli-
gion"; and third, "the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.'" Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1980)). Over the
years, the Court has continued to rely on this test although several Justices have seriously
questioned its validity and utility in recent cases. In a series of opinions dating from 1984,
Justice O'Connor has refined the three-part Lemon test and transformed it into a two-part
inquiry: "whether government's purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute [or
action] actually conveys a message of endorsement." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38. 69 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, "[e]ndorsement sends a message
to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For Justice O'Connor, the test is "whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the [challenged
action] .... would perceive it as a state endorsement of [religion].. . ." Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 76
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The question must be answered not in the abstract but according
to the "unique circumstances" of the challenged action. County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at
3118 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
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the theoretical flaws inherent in the majority's approach and the adminis-
trative concerns raised by the Court's disposition of Mergens. It further
suggests that Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Mergens repre-
sents a more reasoned attempt to preserve the spirit and promote the
legislative goals of the Equal Access Act while balancing the conflicting
values underlying the First Amendment, thus remaining true to constitu-
tional precedent.
I. Equal Access: A Cautious Concession to School Prayer
More than four decades have elapsed since the Court first banned
religious activities in public schools. In Illinois ex reL McCollum v.
Board of Education,'0 the Court held that a school district impermissibly
advanced religion by permitting religious instructors to provide religious
education on a voluntary basis during the school day. In two controver-
sial cases from the early 1960s, the Court directly prohibited religious
worship in the schools. In En gel v. Vitale," a 1962 decision, the Court
ruled that a prayer composed by the New York Board of Regents and
authorized for use in local public schools violated the Establishment
Clause.12 The following year, in Abington Township v. Schempp,'3 the
Court declared it unconstitutional for schools to require or conduct de-
votional use of the Lord's Prayer or Bible reading in the classroom.
These rulings called attention to changes in American society that some
found difficult to acknowledge. America was no longer the homogeneous
Christian community that it once was considered to be.
The Court's decisions on school prayer were met with strong public
opposition and open defiance. Within twenty-four hours after the Court
handed down its decision in Engel, ten members of Congress entered
caustic criticism of the Court into the Congressional Record.'4 As oppo-
sition mounted at the national level, overt noncompliance with the
Court's rulings continued in certain localities. Data gathered from the
1964-1965 school year reveal only slight compliance in the southern
states and the states bordering Mexico, with greater degrees of compli-
ance demonstrated in the remainder of the country. 5 In their study of
five towns in a midwestern state in the late 1960s, Dolbeare and Ham-
10. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
11. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
14. P. Blanshard, RELIGION AND THE SCHooLs: THE GREAT CONTROVERSY 52 (1963).
For a discussion of national reaction to the Engel and Schempp decisions, see generally id.
15. Way, Survey Research on Judicial Decisions: The Prayer and Bible Reading Cases, 21
W. POL. Q. 189, 198-200 (1968).
mond found widespread prayer recitation, Bible reading, and other reli-
gious observances in the public schools. 6 A North Carolina survey
conducted in the early 1980s found religious exercises in thirty-nine of
the state's one hundred counties. More than eighteen percent of the
state's schools conducted prayer on a daily basis.'
7
In the years following the Engel' 8 and Schempp 19 decisions, hun-
dreds of bills were introduced in Congress to override the Court's ban on
school prayer. Through the strategy of constitutional amendment, pro-
ponents of organized public school prayer repeatedly attempted to bring
such exercises within the ambit of the Constitution. By 1975, some 215
such amendments had been introduced in Congress.20
The religious revival of the 1980s pushed the school prayer issue to
the fore of public policy debate. In the 1980 and 1984 presidential elec-
tions, the Republican Party promised as part of its campaign platform to
return prayer to the schools. In fact, the early years of the decade wit-
nessed an almost feverish rise in judicial and legislative activity regarding
the prayer issue. That activity took place in both the federal and state
arenas and brought to public awareness a range of legal and political
strategies to overstep the widely perceived finality of Supreme Court de-
cisions.2" Among these strategies were the constitutional amendment22
and congressional attempts to remove school prayer cases from the fed-
eral courts' subject matter jurisdiction.23
This flourish of activity directed toward school prayer also forced
politicians, lawyers, and educators to address policy alternatives. A prin-
cipal alternative was the "equal access" concept, whereby prayer was
linked to free speech rights. As previously noted, under this theory
schools must permit student-initiated prayer meetings on school grounds
once school authorities have created an "open forum" by permitting
other groups to hold meetings at school.2 4 Other alternatives included
the "moment of silence" in the place of vocal prayer, as well as the con-
16. K. DOLBEARE & P. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS (1971).
17. PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, RELIGION IN NORTH CAROLINA'S PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (1983).
18. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
19. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
20. H. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 328 n.245 (1977).
21. For a broad discussion of national and local activity during this period, see Salomone,
Church, State, and Education: A Preliminary Analysis of Legislative and Judicial Policymak-
ing (1985) (report submitted to the National Institute of Education, Law and Government
Program).
22. Id. at 53-59.
23. Id. at 51-52.
24. Id. at 59-69.
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cept of "voluntary," as opposed to school-organized and mandated,
prayer.25 These proposals raised complex political and constitutional
questions resulting in fierce political battles in Congress, state legisla-
tures, and local communities.
Early on, the Reagan administration established the constitutional
amendment as its preferred strategy for circumventing the Supreme
Court's position on organized school prayer as expressed in Engel26 and
Schempp.27 Between 1982 and 1984, the administration's proposal to
permit vocal prayer in the schools was the subject of heated congres-
sional debate.28 In March of 1984, after several revisions, the Senate
voted on the proposal. The proposed constitutional amendment fell
eleven votes short of the two-thirds required to be submitted for state
ratification.29
With the constitutional amendment issue temporarily laid to rest,
the proponents of school prayer redirected their energies toward several
"equal access" bills that had been weaving their way through Congress
since early 1983. President Reagan immediately urged the Senate to con-
sider one such proposal sponsored by Senator Jeremiah Denton.30
25. Id. at 69-75. As of 1985, at least 25 states had enacted legislation calling for a mo-
ment of silence or prayer. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Courts generally have looked unfavorably on any statutory language related to "prayer." See
id.; see also Duffy v. Las Cruces Public Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013 (D.N.M. 1989); May v.
Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983), aff'd, 780 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1985), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987); Beck v. McElrath, 548 F. Supp. 1161
(M.D. Tenn. 1982), appeal dismissed sub nom. Beck v. Alexander, 718 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir.
1983); Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 387 Mass. 1201, 440 N.E.2d
1159 (1982). In Jaftree, the Justices asserted that at least some moment of silence statutes may
be constitutional. Jaftree, 472 U.S. at 70. These statutes typically call for a moment of silence
at the beginning of the school day during which students may meditate, pray, or reflect on the
activities of the day. See Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional
Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 407-08 (1983). Karcher v. May considered a New Jersey
moment of silence statute that permitted "students to observe a 1 minute period of silence to be
used solely at the discretion of the individual student.., for quiet and private contemplation
or introspection." Karcher, 484 U.S. at 74-75. The Court, however, unanimously dismissed
the appeal for want of jurisdiction. Id at 83. The two legislative leaders who had taken the
appeal to the Supreme Court had lost their posts and the new presiding legislative officers
withdrew the legislature's appeal. Id.
26. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
27. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
28. As originally worded, the proposed amendment read as follows: "Nothing in this
Constitution shall be construed to prohibit individual or group prayer in public schools or
other public institutions. No person shall be required by the United States or by any State to
participate in prayer." S.J. Res. 199, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
29. See Salomone, supra note 21, at 57.
30. The Senate Judiciary Committee had approved Senator Denton's (R.-Ala.) bill by a
12-4 vote earlier that year. In a press conference immediately following the vote on the school
prayer amendment, Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr. (R.-Conn.), the amendment's most vocal
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The Christian Legal Society was the chief architect and guiding
force behind the equal access strategy. Groups such as the American
Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish Congress, and Americans
United for Separation of Church and State initially were opposed to the
concept.31 They eventually came to view "equal access," however, as a
necessary political tradeoff. As public opinion grew in support of school
prayer, equal access presented a more acceptable alternative to organized
prayer in the public schools.32
The equal access concept raises constitutional questions concerning
first amendment rights to free speech and the free exercise of religion. As
developed through litigation and through more recent federal legislation,
at the core of the equal access rationale lies the view of prayer as a type
of speech.33 Government cannot restrain speech because of its content,
whether political, ideological, or religious.
Before the equal access bills were proposed, four federal courts of
appeals had ruled against student religious groups meeting on school
grounds.34 Although the Supreme Court had upheld the equal access
concept at the university level in Widmar v. Vincent,35 the Court demon-
strated a reluctance to address the constitutionality of voluntary prayer
meetings in secondary schools. In 1982, the Court denied review to the
Second Circuit opinion in Brandon v. Board of Education6 and the Fifth
Circuit opinion in Lubbock Independent School District v. Lubbock Civil
Liberties Union.37
In denying certiorari to the Lubbock case, the Court ignored the
concerns expressed in an amicus brief submitted by a bipartisan group of
twenty-four senators.38 In supporting the school district's petition for
opponent, stated that he "might very well" vote for an equal access bill. EDUC. WEEK, Mar.
28, 1984, at 1.
31. See Salomone, supra note 21, at 60.
32. Id.
33. See Strossen, A Framework for Evaluating Equal Access Claims by Student Religious
Groups: Is There a Window for Free Speech in the Wall Separating Church and State?, 71
CORNELL L. Rrv. 143 (1985).
34. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Nartowicz v. Clayton County School Dist., 736 F.2d 646
(1 th Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Ind. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
35. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
36. 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
37. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
38. Brief for Members of the United States Congress in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Lubbock Ind School
Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (No. 82-805) [hereinafter Congressional Amicus Brief]. The senators
warned the Justices of more drastic alternatives pending before Congress, namely the adminis-
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certiorari, the senators noted that the lower federal courts were "inter-
preting the Constitution in a way that is hostile to religion."' 39 The con-
gressional brief, in substance, asked the Court to extend its Widmar
ruling from the previous year4° to primary and secondary educational
institutions.41
In Widmar, members of a registered religious group at the Univer-
sity of Missouri at Kansas City challenged the university's policy of
prohibiting religious groups from having access to university facilities.
The group's claims were based on first amendment free speech and free
exercise grounds. Under the university's open forum policy, university
buildings were available for activities of registered student groups. Writ-
ing for an eight-member majority, Justice Powell used free speech doc-
trine as the linchpin of his analysis. The Court held that the university
policy constituted a content-based exclusion from a public forum and
could withstand constitutional attack only if the policy served a compel-
ling state interest and was narrowly drawn to achieve that end.42
The University claimed a compelling interest in maintaining a strict
separation between church and state in compliance with the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment and with applicable provisions of
the Missouri Constitution.43 The Widmar Court recognized that the
University's concerns may be characterized as compelling. 4 These inter-
ests, however, were not "sufficiently 'compelling' to justify content-based
discrimination against [the students'] religious speech."45 In fact, the
Court concluded that the University's asserted state interest in achieving
greater separation of church and state than required under the Establish-
ment Clause was limited in this case by the content-based prohibitions of
the Free Speech Clause.46
In discussing the establishment clause claim per se, the Court ap-
plied the three-part Lemon test.47 The Court determined that allowing
equal access would not have a primary purpose or effect of advancing
tration's proposed constitutional amendment and the Helms bill to remove federal court juris-
diction from school prayer cases. They urged the Court to reaffirm the first amendment
principle of neutrality by resolving this "issue of unusual importance." Id. at 3.
39. Id.
40. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
41. Congressional Amicus Brief, supra note 38, at 11.
42. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270.
43. See Mo. CONsT. art. 1, §§ 6, 7; art. 9, § 8.
44. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271.
45. Id at 276.
46. Id. at 267.
47. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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religion, nor would it entail excessive government entanglement with
religion.
Proponents of equal access legislation have argued that if religious
worship is protected speech for college students, then the same expres-
sion should be protected for elementary and secondary school students.4"
The critics of equal access legislation have read into the Widmar dicta a
distinction to be drawn based on the age of the students in question.49 In
addressing the "effects" prong of the Lemon test and the potential danger
of conferring an "imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or prac-
tices,"50 the Court stated that university students are "less impressiona-
ble than younger students and should be able to appreciate that the
University's policy is one of neutrality toward religion."51
Between February 1983 and June 1984, several alternative equal ac-
cess measures were introduced and debated in Congress.5 2 After a series
of compromises among the competing forces, the Equal Access Act was
48. See generally Note, Beyond Neutrality: Equal Access and the Meaning of Religious
Freedom, 12 U. ARK. LrrrLE RoCK L.J. 335 (1989-90); Laycock, Equal Access and Moments
of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 1
(1986); Strossen, supra note 33.
49. Rossow & Rossow, Student Initiated Religious Activity: Constitutional Argument or
Psychological Inquiry, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 207 (1990); Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal
Access Policies and Legislation Allowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Acitivities in the
Public High Schoolv" A Proposal for a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGs
CONST. L.Q. 529 (1985).
50. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
51. Id at 272 n.14.
52. In February 1983, Senator Jeremiah Denton (R.-Ala.) introduced the administration-
backed Equal Access Act, S. 425, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), which sought to provide "equal
access and opportunity to public school students who wish to meet voluntarily for religious
purposes." The measure further provided for a cutoff of federal aid to school districts that
deny "students or faculty... or groups of students... [or] faculty.. ." the opportunity to
"seek to engage in voluntary prayer, religious discussion or silent meditation on school prem-
ises during noninstructional periods." The following month, Senator Mark Hatfield (R.-Ore.)
and fourteen colleagues representing both the Democratic and Republican parties introduced
an alternative bill entitled The Religious Speech Protection Act of 1983, S. 815, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983). The Hatfield bill provided that:
[it] shall be unlawful for a public secondary school receiving Federal financial assist-
ance, which generally allows groups of students to meet during noninstructional peri-
ods, to discriminate against any meeting of students on the basis of the religious
content of the speech at such meeting, if (1) the meeting is voluntary and orderly,
and (2) no activity which is in and of itself unlawful is permitted.
The bill further provided that no political or governmental authority can "influence the form
or content of any prayer or other religious activity" nor may it "require any person to partici-
pate in prayer or other religious activity." In April 1983, Rep. Trent Lott (R.-Miss.) intro-
duced legislation in the House that was almost identical to the Denton bill pending in the
Senate. H.R. 2732, 98th Cong. 1st Sess. (1983).
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signed into law by President Reagan in August 1984.11
In an immediate effort to avoid litigation and to assist school dis-
tricts in complying with the law, a broad coalition of education and legal
groups drafted guidelines for implementing the Equal Access Act.54 But
questions concerning the constitutionality and applicability of the law
persisted. Lawyers on both sides of the issue believed that litigating the
nuances of the law would occupy court calendars for years to come.
Would the law require access to public schools for groups such as the Ku
Klux Klan? Could school administrators bypass the law's "limited open
forum" provisions by prohibiting all noncurriculum activities from using
school facilities? The most significant and immediate concern was the
inherent conflict between the Act and federal court rulings declaring it
unconstitutional for schools to permit student-run religious meetings on
school grounds. In the twelve states of the Second, Third, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits, school districts ran the risk of violating court orders if
they attempted to implement the statute.55 Some but not all of these
53. Equal Access Act of 1984, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1989). The proposal adopted by the
Senate, S. 815, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), did not provide special sanctions, such as the
termination of federal funding. It would merely have made it unlawful for a public secondary
school that receives federal financial assistance "to discriminate against any meeting of stu-
dents on the basis of the religious content of the speech at such meeting." In a compromise
reached with Senate opponents, the measure would allow student political and philosophical
groups to meet in public high schools. The bill covered only secondary, not elementary,
schools and required that all such meetings be student-initiated, voluntary, and without school
sponsorship. A compromise engineered by the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs lim-
ited the access of outside groups. In July 1984, a similar compromise measure was cleared by a
vote of 377 to 77 in the House. H.R. 5439, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
54. The EqualAccess Guidelines, reprinted in 130 CONG. REc. S14,473-76 (daily ed. Oct.
11, 1984). Among the principal participants were the American Association of School Admin-
istrators, the Christian Legal Society, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Educa-
tion Association, Americans for Democratic Action, the National Association for
Evangelicals, and the Baptist Joint Committee for Public Affairs. The guidelines, presented in
a question and answer format, addressed concerns over the rights of student groups and the
responsibilities of school administrators. The American Jewish Congress (AJC) steadfastly
opposed the equal access legislation. Rather than sign off on this joint set of guidelines, the
AJC published its own guide to implement the Act, which it believed to be "ill advised, badly
drafted and likely to be held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court." AMERICAN JEWISH
CONGRESS, COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION, EQUAL AccEss: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE (1984). In a further effort to minimize local controversy over implementation of the
Equal Access Act, the Christian Legal Society, the American Association of School Adminis-
trators, and the American Civil Liberties Union decided to operate separate hotlines from their
respective Washington offices to answer questions regarding the Equal Access Act. See Salo-
mone, supra note 21, at 68.
55. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. In the years following the enactment of the
Equal Access Act, two additional circuits held that allowing student religious groups to meet
during noninstructional time would violate the Establishment Clause. See Garnett v. Renton
School Dist. No. 403, 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989); Bell v. Little Axe Indep. School Dist.,
766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985).
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concerns would ultimately be resolved by the Court six years later in
Board of Education v. Mergens."6
II. Board of Education v. Mergens
A. Background of the Case
Westside High School is part of the Westside community school sys-
tem, a public school district in Omaha, Nebraska. As a public school,
Westside receives federal funds. The school permits students to join any
number of approximately thirty student groups that meet on a voluntary
basis after school hours on school grounds. All the clubs have faculty
sponsors, and the clubs are recognized as a "'vital part of the total edu-
cation program as a means of developing citizenship, wholesome atti-
tudes, good human relations, knowledge and skills.' "I'
In January 1985, the plaintiffs, students at Westside, presented
school officials with their request to form a Christian Bible study club.
Until that date, no club had ever been denied access to the school. Nev-
ertheless, Westside's principal, the associate superintendent, and the su-
perintendent of schools for the Westside Community Schools each
successively denied the students' request. The students petitioned the
school board, assuring the board members that the students were not
requesting a faculty sponsor, but if one was required by board policy, the
sponsor would serve only a custodial function. The board denied the
petition, stating that the proposed club was inconsistent with board pol-
icy that school buildings be used exclusively for school-sponsored curric-
ulum-related activities.
In April 1985, the students filed suit in the District Court for the
District of Nebraska. They alleged violations of the Equal Access Act
and violations of their rights (1) under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution, (2) under Article I of the Ne-
braska Constitution, and (3) to freedom of speech, assembly and
association, and free exercise of religion. On the claim under the Act, the
dispute focused on ten of the thirty voluntary student clubs at Westside.
The students maintained that these ten clubs were noncurriculum re-
lated and thus constituted evidence that the school had created a "lim-
ited open forum" that triggered the Act's provisions.5" School officials,
56. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
57. Id. at 2362 (quoting School Board Policy 5610).
58. Although the Equal Access Act does not specifically define "noncurriculum related,"
§ 4071(b) of the Act defines "limited open forum" as follows: "A public secondary school has
a limited open forum whenever such school grants an offering to or opportunity for one or
more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises during noninstruction
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on the other hand, maintained that all of these student activities were
curriculum related because they furthered the goals of particular aspects
of the school's curriculum. The district court entered judgment for the
defendant school district.5 9 The court held that the Act did not apply
because all of Westside's student clubs were tied to the educational func-
tion of the school and therefore were curriculum related.' In other
words, Westside had not created a "limited open forum" as defined by
the Act. The court further rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.
Distinguishing the case from the Supreme Court's 1981 decision in
Widmar v. Vincent,6 the court reasoned that Westside had not created a
"limited public forum."62 Applying the reasonableness standard articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlneier
63
the Court concluded that Westside's denial of the students' request was
"reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."' 6
The students appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, which reversed the lower court's decision. 65 The appel-
late court rejected the district court's conclusion that all the student
clubs at Westside were curriculum related. The appellate court reasoned
that such a "broad interpretation" would render the Equal Access Act
meaningless and would allow school officials unfettered discretion in
choosing which student groups to permit merely "by tying the purposes
of those student clubs to some broadly defined educational goals."61 6 The
appellate court further rejected Westside's contention that the Act vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. Relying on legislative history, the court
noted that the Act extended the Supreme Court's ruling in Widmar 67 to
public secondary schools. The court dismissed as insignificant any dis-
tinction between the maturity level of secondary and university students
for purposes of establishment clause analysis. The Supreme Court
time." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (1984). The clubs in dispute included Interact (a service club re-
lated to Rotary International); Chess; Subsurfers (a club for students interested in scuba div-
ing); National Honor Society; Photography; Welcome to Westside (a club to introduce new
students to the school); Future Business Leaders of America; Zonta (the female counterpart to
Interact); Student Advisory Board (student government); and Student Forum (student
government).
59. Mergens v. Board of Educ., No. CV 85-0-426, slip. op. at 20 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
60. Id at 17.
61. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
62. Id
63. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
64. Mergens, No. CV85-0-426, slip op. at 19 (citing Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).
65. 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989).
66. Id. at 1078.
67. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
granted certiorari and affirmed the appellate court's decision.68
B. The Supreme Court's Views
In Board of Education v. Mergens,69 the Supreme Court addressed
the applicability of the Equal Access Act7' to Westside High School and
the constitutionality of the Act itself. Eight Justices upheld both the
Act's applicability and its constitutionality. Although a six-member ma-
jority agreed on the rationale underlying the statutory interpretation,71
only a plurality of four, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, agreed com-
pletely on the rationale underlying the establishment clause discussion.72
L The Majority on Statutory Interpretation
The Court's interpretation of the Equal Access Act as applied to
Westside centered on the statute's use of the term "noncurriculum re-
lated student groups" in its definition of a "limited open forum." Re-
jecting the legislative history as too ambiguous to offer clear guidance on
the interpretation of the Equal Access Act's terms, the Court looked to
the Act's broad legislative purpose to address perceived widespread dis-
crimination against religious speech in public schools. 73 In view of this
purpose, the Court concluded that Congress had intended to provide a
low threshold for triggering the Act and interpreted the term "noncur-
riculum related student group" broadly to include "any student group
that does not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the
school."'7 4 Expanding on this definition, the Court addressed the obverse
concept of "curriculum related" as follows:
A student group directly relates to a school's curriculum if the sub-
ject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be taught,
in a regularly offered course; if the subject matter of the group con-
cerns the body of courses as a whole; if participation in the group is
required for a particular course; or if participation in the group
results in academic credit.75
68. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
69. Id.
70. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1989).
71. Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices White, Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy,
joined in Parts I and II of Justice O'Connor's opinion.
72. Chief Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices White and Blackmun, joined in Part III
of Justice O'Connor's opinion.
73. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366 (citing H.R. REP. No. 98-710, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1984)); see S. REP. No. 98-357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1984).
74. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2366 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. The Equal Access Act states that "[t]he term 'meeting' includes those activities of
student groups which are permitted under a school's limited open forum and are not directly
related to the school curriculum." 20 U.S.C. § 4072 (3) (1989).
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Applying these guidelines to Westside, the Court concluded that one
or more "noncurriculum related" student groups were meeting at the
school, including Subsurfers and Chess, that were not required by any
course and did not result in extra academic credit for any class.76
On the issue of "equal access" per se, the Court maintained that
although school officials had allowed the student group to meet infor-
mally after school, this allowance fell short of the statutory mandate.77
The students had requested official school recognition and all the inci-
dental benefits such recognition carries, including access to the school
newspaper, bulletin boards, the public address system, and the annual
Club Fair.7" The Court upheld the students' rights on statutory grounds,
while it expressly set aside the question of whether the Free Speech
Clause would require the same result. The students' free speech rights,
however, weighed heavily in the plurality's discussion of the Establish-
ment Clause.
2. The Plurality Opinion on the Establishment Clause
After determining that the Equal Access Act applied to Westside,
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion turned to the facial validity of the
Act; here Justices Kennedy and Scalia parted ways with the plurality.
The defendant school board had argued in the alternative that the Act
violated the Establishment Clause. According to school officials, student
groups that received official recognition were an integral part of the
school's educational mission. Therefore, if the school officially recog-
nized the proposed religious club, such recognition would "endorse par-
76. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2369; cf Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 865 F.2d 1121 (9th
Cir. 1989). In Garnett, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that all 15 stu-
dent clubs existing at Lindbergh High School were curriculum related and thereby did not
trigger the Equal Access Act for purposes of religious club approval. Some of these clubs,
such as the Bowling Club and Chess Club, were strikingly similar to the clubs found to be
noncurriculum related by the Court in Mergens. The Ninth Circuit clearly read the legislative
history of the Act as providing evidence of congressional intent to grant local school districts
discretion in defining cirriculum relatedness. Ia at 1127.
77. The Equal Access Act provides:
Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct a
meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides that-()
the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated; (2) there is no sponsorship of the
meeting by the school, the government, or its agents or employees; (3) employees or
agents of the school or government are present at religious meetings only in a
nonparticipatory capacity; (4) the meeting does not materially and substantially in-
terfere with the orderly conduct of educational activities within the school; and (5)
nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend activities of
student groups.
20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1989).
78. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2370.
ticipation in the religious club, and provide the club with an official
platform to proselytize other students."7 9 In other words, compliance
with the Act's protection of religious groups would run counter to estab-
lishment clause principles.
In rejecting this argument, Justice O'Connor relied on two decades
of Supreme Court precedents and applied the three-part "Lemon test"80
as revised by her "endorsement test." Having concluded that Congress
intended to incorporate Widmar v. Vincent81 into the Equal Access Act,
the plurality reasoned that the logic of Widmar applied with equal force
to the Act. According to the plurality, the Act has an avowedly secular
purpose, granting on its face equal access to both secular and religious
groups.8 2 The plurality further rejected the school's principal argument
that the Act has the primary effect of advancing religion. Here, Justice
O'Connor applied her endorsement test and the concept of the "objective
observer" to the secondary school setting. Citing her concurring opinion
from the previous term in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 3 she identified
the essential establishment clause inquiry here as whether the govern-
ment is "conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief
is favored or preferred."84 The plurality rejected the school's reliance on
the compulsory nature of schooling and the impressionability of secon-
dary school students. Citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School District,"5 they concluded that such students are "mature
enough ... to understand that a school does not endorse or support
student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis."86
Unlike the school funding cases, which concerned government
speech endorsing religion (prohibited by the Establishment Clause),
equal access concerns private speech endorsing religion (protected by the
79. Id.
80. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
81. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
82. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2361.
83. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (O'Connor, ., concurring). For discussions in support of the
endorsement test and a history of its development, see Beschle, The Conservative as Liberak
The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 151 (1987); Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion
Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64
N.C.L. REV. 1049 (1986); Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Justice O'Connor's Endorse-
ment Test, 68 N.C.L. Rav. 590 (1990).
84. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371 (quoting County of Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3119
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring))).
85. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
86. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. 503).
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Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses). 87 The plurality maintained that
the Act's requirement that religious meetings be held during noninstruc-
tional time and be student-initiated, coupled with the prohibition on
faculty sponsors, lessened the risk of official state endorsement or coer-
cion. The absence of faculty sponsorship further led the plurality to dis-
miss the school's argument that compliance with the Act would create
excessive governmental entanglement with religion. Although the Act
permits the assignment of a teacher or administrator to religious groups
to ensure order and good behavior, such custodial oversight "does not
impermissibly entangle government in the day-to-day surveillance or ad-
ministration of religious activities."88
3. The Kennedy-Scalia Concurrence
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred with the plural-
ity's interpretation of "noncurriculum related groups" and with its con-
clusion as to the Equal Access Act's constitutionality. They sharply
disagreed, however, with the plurality's analysis of the establishment
clause question. Justice Kennedy openly rejected the plurality's endorse-
ment test on the ground that the word "endorsement has insufficient con-
tent to be dispositive."89 In its stead, Justice Kennedy would have
applied the two-part test he had articulated the previous term in his sepa-
rate opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.9" Justice Kennedy's in-
quiry was much narrower than Justice O'Connor's endorsement test and
was based on two principles. The first principle precludes the govern-
ment from giving "'direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in
fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so." "91 The second, principle provides that the government "cannot
coerce any student to participate in a religious activity." '92
The groups protected by the Act were those that were student-initi-
ated and voluntary, that met during noninstructional time, and that did
not compel school employees to participate or attend. Thus, enforce-
ment of the Equal Access Act would not coerce students to participate in
a religious activity.
87. Id. (citing Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985)).
88. Id. at 2373-78.
89. Id. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
91. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2377 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. at 3136 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678 (1984))).
92. Id.
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4. The Marshall-Brennan Concurrence
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a concurring
opinion differing from the other Justices in its focus and its underlying
rationale. Reaching the constitutional heart of the equal access issue-
the tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech
Clause-the opinion integrates linguistically and conceptually the en-
dorsement test of the Establishment Clause with the Free Speech
Clause's public forum doctrine.93 In so doing, it tracks and updates the
Court's analysis in Widmar v. Vincent,9" which predated the endorse-
ment test developments of recent years and further places the discussion
within the Court's developing ideology of schooling as consistently ar-
ticulated in a series of cases beginning in the mid-1970s.
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority's disposition of the legal
issues and with the plurality's use of the endorsement analysis in its dis-
cussion of the Establishment Clause. He did not take exception to the
majority's interpretation of terms used in the Equal Access Act nor did
he disagree about the Act's facial constitutionality. He did, however,
raise serious questions as to the constitutionality of the Act as applied in
any given secondary school setting. His opinion assumed that the Act
applied to the circumstances of Westside High School and then pro-
ceeded to caution that the school must take certain steps to ensure that
the Act's implementation did not run afoul of the Establishment Clause.
93. Over the years, the Court has developed the public forum doctrine to address the
rights of individuals to engage in expressive activity on government property. In Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), the Court identified three types of
fora: (1) traditional public fora, which "by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate," and which include public streets and parks; (2) public fora
created by government designation for use by the public at large for assembly or speech, for
use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain subjects; (3) nonpublic fora. Regula-
tion concerning the first two categories must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state
interest. In the third category, control over access may be based on subject matter and speaker
identity, as long as the distinctions made are reasonable in light of the purpose served and are
viewpoint neutral. Id. at 45-46. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473
U.S. 788 (1984), the Court appeared to empty the second category (limited public forum) of
any meaning by describing it in a manner indistinguishable from a traditional public forum.
Here the majority held that when the government has granted "selective access, unsupported
by evidence of purposeful designation for public use," then a public forum is not created. Id
at 805. As evidence of intent, the Court would look to the "policy and practice" of the govern-
ment as well as the "nature of the property" and its "compatibility with expressive activity."
Id. at 802. The majority in Cornelius appeared to grant the government unfettered discretion
in defining the particular forum and its boundaries. Id at 826 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 109 (1986). The Court's subsequent decision in Hazelwood School Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), reflects this narrowing of the public forum doctrine. See infra
notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
94. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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For Justice Marshall, the crucial question is how the Act affects each
school.
Within this analytical framework, Justice Marshall proceeded to
distinguish the facts of Mergens95 from those of Widmar,96 a distinction
that the majority easily dismissed. For Justice Marshall, there is a criti-
cal dichotomy between toleration of religious speech on one hand, and
its endorsement on the other-a distinction addressed at length in
Widmar. In his view, this difference between toleration and endorsement
depends not on the maturity of students but on the type of forum created
by the school and the role that the school plays in students' lives.
97
Translated into Justice O'Connor's words, these factors bear on the
school's behavior and thereby determine the "message" that is conveyed
to the student "observers."
In Widmar, the University of Missouri had recognized a broad
group of advocacy-oriented clubs, thereby creating a "truly robust fo-
rum."' 98 By contrast, no such forum existed at Westside. In fact, en-
forcement of the Equal Access Act required Westside High School to
recognize religious speech through a religion club when the school had
not recognized political or other ideological speech through other stu-
dent groups. Coupled with the broad access to school facilities afforded
by the Act, this recognition may create in students the perception that
the school is endorsing religious speech rather than merely permitting it
on a nondiscriminatory basis. In other words, although the safeguards
built into the Equal Access Act99 may be sufficient to prevent school
"sponsorship" as defined by the Act itself,"o° the Establishment Clause
may require more affirmative acts of disassociation on the part of schools
so that they do not convey a message of endorsement.
In Widmar, the university had taken affirmative steps to disassociate
itself from the "'aims, policies, programs, products, or opinions of any
95. 110 S. Ct. 2356.
96. 454 U.S. 263.
97. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2381 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's apparent
refusal to distinguish between high school and college students reaffirms the broad view of
student free speech rights he has espoused in other cases. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 285
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("educators cannot act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of all but
state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position.")
98. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2381 (Marshall, J., concurring).
99. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c) (1989).
100. The Equal Access Act states as follows:
The term 'sponsorship' includes the act of promoting, leading, or participating in a
meeting. The assignment of a teacher, administrator, or other school employee to a
meeting for custodial purposes does not constitute sponsorship of the meeting.
Id. § 4072(2).
organization or its members.' "101 Westside High School, on the other
hand, explicitly promoted its student clubs "'as a vital part of the total
education program [and] as a means of developing citizenship.' "102
Justice Marshall viewed this specific distinction as reflective of a
more general difference in the respective functions and missions of col-
leges and secondary schools:
To the extent that a school emphasizes the autonomy of its stu-
dents, as does the University of Missouri, there is a corresponding
decrease in the likelihood that student speech will be regarded as
school speech. Conversely, where a school such as Westside re-
gards its student clubs as a mechanism for defining and transmit-
ting fundamental values, the inclusion of a religious club in the
school's program will almost certainly signal school endorsement
of the religious practice. 103
According to Justice Marshall, two factors present in Mergens re-
quired Westside to disassociate itself from the activities and goals of reli-
gious clubs. The first factor was the existence of the religious club as the
sole advocacy-oriented group in the forum (or one of a very limited
number of such groups). The second factor was that the school pro-
moted its student club program as instrumental to citizenship."'
Justice Marshall suggested that the compulsory nature of public
schooling could further lead to peer pressure for which the state could be
responsible, a danger that the majority acknowledged but dismissed as de
minimis. Given the nature of public education in general, and the func-
tion of student groups as defined by Westside High School in particular,
Justice Marshall determined that schools like Westside must "effectively
disassociate themselves from the religious speech that may now become
commonplace in their facilities."10' 5 Such disassociation could be accom-
plished in two ways. The school could "entirely discontinue encouraging
student participation in clubs and clarify that the clubs are not instru-
mentally related to the school's overall mission," 106 or the school could
continue to endorse clubs that do not engage in controversial speech
while affirmatively disclaiming any endorsement of religious clubs."0 7
101. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (quoting 1980-81 University of
Missouri at Kansas City student handbook at 25).
102. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2381 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting School Board Policy
5610).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2380.
105. Id. at 2382-83.
106. Id at 2382.
107. Id.
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5. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter in Mergens. Although his
opinion raises valid administrative and political concerns, its narrow in-
terpretation of the Equal Access Act's coverage finds no support in the
language of the Act and appears to undermine its broad legislative pur-
pose. Like the other Justices, Justice Stevens juxtaposed the facts of
Mergens against those of Widmar. His comparison, however, focused
not on the dangers of endorsement under the Establishment Clause but
rather on the extent to which the respective schools had created an
"open" or "public" forum (using the terms synonymously in contrast to
the majority view) °8 under the Free Speech Clause.
Justice Stevens agreed with the other Justices that Congress had in-
tended to apply the Widnar decision to secondary schools when enacting
the Equal Access Act. Justice Stevens, however, interpreted the congres-
sional intent more narrowly than the majority and included only those
schools that had established a public forum similar to the forum created
by the University of Missouri in Widmar. In his view, Westside High
School did not fall into that group. The University of Missouri forum
involved the participation of more than one hundred officially recognized
student groups, many of which were not only unrelated to any courses
but were of such a controversial nature that the university could not en-
dorse them. For Justice Stevens, these were the type of "noncurriculum
related" student groups that Congress had in mind in enacting the Equal
Access Act-organizations that have as their purpose "the advocacy of
partisan theological, political, or ethical views."1 9 In other words, the
recognition of advocacy groups signals the creation of a "limited open
forum" under the Act. Given this narrow definition of a "noncurriculum
related" group, with no support from the language of the Act and scant
support from legislative history, Justice Stevens concluded that Westside
High School had not created a "limited open forum." Therefore, the
school was not required to grant official recognition and status to the
plaintiffs' proposed group in Mergens.
By relying on statutory construction, Justice Stevens could have
avoided the constitutional issues raised in the case. He seized the oppor-
tunity, however, to criticize the majority for dismissing establishment
clause concerns too lightly and for getting "perilously close to an out-
right command to allow organized prayer.., on school premises."110
108. Id. at 2389 n.18 (Stevens, J., dissenting), (contrasting the plurality discussion, id. at
2367).
109. Id. at 2385.
110. Id. at 2391.
Justice Stevens further suggested that the majority had misapplied the
Court's free speech clause precedents.111 In this regard, he cast Mergens
as closer to Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier '12 than Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.113 As in Hazelwood, the
students in Mergens sought "active assistance in the dissemination of
their ideas," '114 not mere assistance "to prevent state interference with
their communicative activities"'1 15 as in Tinker. If we carry this analogy
and distinction further, then the Court should have recognized the dan-
gers of symbolic state endorsement in Mergens as it had in Hazelwood.
Finally, Justice Stevens raised federalism concerns, viewing the ma-
jority's interpretation of the Equal Access Act as a "sweeping intrusion
by the federal government into the operation of our public schools
.... "16 For Justice Stevens, such a broad interpretation of "noncur-
riculum related groups" limited the discretion of local school officials to
exclude controversial groups once the school is opened to any traditional
extra-curricular activities.
I. Mergens and Prior Case Law
When we examine the rationales underlying the four opinions in
Mergens, we find both consistency and inconsistency with trends in the
Court's thinking. In terms of overall judicial philosophy, the Court as-
sumes a more restrained view of its role vis-A-vis the legislature. The
111. Id. at 2392 n.22.
112. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
113. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See Green, The Misnomer of Equality Under the Equal Access
Act, 14 VT. L. REv. 369 (1990) for a discussion of the rights of individual student expression
exemplified in Tinker versus claims for organized group speech on public school campuses
represented by the equal access concept. According to Green, schools are granted greater
latitude in restricting the second type of expression, especially where it is inconsistent with the
"'special interests of [the school in] overseeing the use of the property.'" Ia at 393 (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980)).
114. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2392 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Stewart, The First
Amendment, The Public School, and the Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J. LAW &
EDUC. 23, 36 (1989)).
115. Id. (citing Stewart, supra note 114, at 36).
116. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens demonstrated
similar deference to local officials in both Widmar and Hazelwood. In Widmar, he voted with
the majority but, in a separate concurrence, questioned whether public universities, because of
their educational purpose, could ever be considered true public fora. He further argued that
they should not be required to establish a compelling state interest to defend their decisions to
limit access to particular student groups. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277-81 (1981)
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also joined the majority opinion in Hazelwood, which
expressly granted greater latitude to secondary school administrators in defining the parame-
ters of acceptable student speech and explicitly lowered the standard to one of "reasonable-
ness." Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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reluctance of eight Justices to invalidate the Equal Access Act on consti-
tutional grounds underscores a traditional deference to the decisions of
coordinate branches of government and a more recent heightened con-
cern for the structural limits built into separation-of-powers doctrine.
Related to this trend, the majority's rejection of legislative history and its
reliance on the "plain meaning" of statutory language gives evidence that
the conservative Justices may be moving the Court toward a "textualist"
approach to statutory interpretation.' 17
These philosophical shifts in the Court's reasoning may serve to jus-
tify the majority's broad interpretation of "noncurriculum related
groups" and the "limited open forum" that trigger the Equal Access
Act's provisions. If we consider the opinions of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy to represent the views of a six-member Court majority, how-
ever, then the case reveals several startling inconsistencies with other
trends in Court thinking. The majority's analysis departs significantly
from recent Court pronouncements on the function and mission of public
schooling, on the limits of free speech rights enjoyed by secondary school
students, and on the discretion of local officials to make curricular
determinations.
Over the years, the Court has struggled to balance the conflicting
goals of public education. Prior to the 1970s, the Court's decisions re-
flected a "progressive" theory of schooling, as exemplified by the writings
of John Dewey. For Dewey, education's primary function was to de-
velop the child's thought processes. According to this view, education
should be a participatory process with goals of maximizing interaction
and independent thought." 8 Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, the
Court began to move toward a model of "cultural transmission," empha-
sizing education as the means through which societal values are incul-
cated. "'19 Underlying this shift away from the liberty interests recognized
in previous decades and towards a concern for community preservation,
constitutional values sit framed in the language of school authority and
local control. 120 The Mergens majority paid lip service to this trend in
117. See Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes
in the 1988-1989 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 277 (1990).
Chief Judge Wald reviews recent Supreme Court decisions and concludes that the "textualist"
approach focusing on the primacy of statutory language has made significant gains among the
Justices.
118. J. DEwEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION (1916).
119. Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individ-
ual Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647 (1986); Note, Education and the Court:
The Supreme Court's Educational Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REv. 939 (1987).
120. See Chesler, Imagery of Community, Ideology of Authority: The Moral Reasoning of
ChiefJustice Burger, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457 (1983); Salomone, Children Versus the
Court thinking, but the reasoning underlying Justice O'Connor's opinion
does not support it.
The Court's strongest affirmation of this shift in values came in Ha-
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.1 21 In Hazelwood, the Court upheld
the action of a high school principal in deleting several articles from the
school newspaper that he deemed "inappropriate." According to the six-
member majority, when the school has not established a "public forum,"
educators do not violate free speech rights under the First Amendment
by exercising editorial control over school-sponsored activities "so long
as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns."122 According to the Court, "a school must be able to take into
account the emotional maturity of the intended audience" and "retain
the authority to refuse... to associate the school with any position other
than neutrality on matters of political controversy." '23 Absent any
"clear intent to create a public forum" by policy or practice and thereby
open the school newspaper to "indiscriminate use," school officials could
regulate the content of the newspaper in "any reasonable manner."124
In Hazelwood, the Court drew a clear distinction between toleration
and promotion of student speech. Unlike the symbolic speech upheld in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, I5 publica-
tion of the newspaper articles in Hazelwood required the school not
merely to tolerate speech, but to "lend its name and resources" to its
dissemination.
[Toleration] addresses the educators' ability to silence a student's
personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.
[Promotion] concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school. These activities may
fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or
not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they
are supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particu-
lar knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.
Educators are entitled to exercise greater control over this sec-
ond form of student expression to assure that.., the views of the
State: The Status of Students' Rights, in CARING FOR AMERICA'S CHILDREN 182 (F. Mae-
chiarola & A. Gartner eds. 1989); Stewart, supra note 114; Urofsky, Mr. Justice Powell and
Education: The Balancing of Competing Values, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 581 (1984); Whitman, Indi-
vidual and Community: An Appreciation of Mr. Justice Powell, 68 VA. L. REv. 303 (1982).
121. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
122. Id. at 273.
123. Id. at 272.
124. Id. at 270,
125. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.126
The views expressed in Hazelwood stand in stark contrast to those
expressed by many of the same Justices just two years later in
Mergens.1 27 If the perception of school sponsorship were the real fear
underlying Hazelwood, then any distinctions that may be drawn between
the facts of this case and those of Mergens are not sufficiently significant
to lead to a different result. Under the broad definition laid out by the
Hazelwood majority, one could reasonably conclude that the student-run
groups at Westside High School were "curriculum related" and therefore
outside the provisions of the Equal Access Act in view of the school's
policy statement that represented the clubs as "a vital part of the total
education program ' 121 and "as a means of developing citizenship...
knowledge and skills." 129 These groups were not mere vehicles for stu-
dent expression that "happened" to occur on school premises; they fur-
thered the school's specific educational goals. Yet the Court in Mergens
unleashed a significant segment of these clubs from the curriculum,
straining a broad interpretation of an ambiguous statute, and then dis-
missed any potential for symbolic school endorsement of the expressed
views.
Even if we accept the majority's conclusion that at least some of the
groups were sufficiently noncurriculum related to create a limited open
forum that triggered the Equal Access Act's application, Justice Mar-
shall's discussion of the type of forum created and its impact on estab-
lishment clause analysis deserves attention. Justice Marshall recognized
variations within the category of the limited open forum. The more "ro-
bust" the forum-that is, the broader the range of controversial ideas
expressed by student run groups-the less likely the dangers of govern-
ment endorsement of any religious speech.
The plurality's discussion of the Establishment Clause appears to
run counter to Justice O'Connor's own prior analyses. In previous cases
she had described her endorsement test as applicable to the "unique cir-
cumstances" of each case. Nevertheless, in Mergens she failed to con-
sider key factual distinctions between that case and Widmar that should
have called for an opposite result. On the one hand, she recognized as a
126. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
127. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). In Hlazelwood, Justice White
wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor,
and Stevens. In Mergens, all but Justice Stevens joined in the majority, including Justice
Blackmun, who, along with Justice Marshall, had joined in the Hazelwood dissent written by
Justice Brennan.
128. Id. at 2362.
129. Id.
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general proposition that schools have control over the impressions they
make upon their students. To support this assertion, she cited the Uni-
versity of Missouri's handbook disclaiming any identification with the
aims, policies, or opinions of any student group. 130 Yet, unlike Justice
Marshall, Justice O'Connor failed to draw the obvious and significant
distinction between this disclaimer and Westside's broadly stated policy
on the curricular goals of its student groups. In so doing, she completely
overlooked one of the key factors in the Court's determination of "effect"
in Widmar.
Justice O'Connor characterized the speech in Mergens as "private"
rather than "government" speech endorsing religion.13 1 This characteri-
zation disregards the actual and symbolic perception of state action in-
herent in the compulsory nature of schooling. Any form of expression
exercised by anyone within the public school runs the risk of appearing
to be endorsed by government officials. The Hazelwood Court recog-
nized the magnitude of this concern and held that it outweighed the free
speech rights of student editors, at least where the school had not created
a public forum by opening the newspaper to indiscriminate use. Justice
Marshall's recommendation in Mergens that schools "disassociate"
themselves from certain forms of student speech, even where a limited
open forum exists, 1 2 recognized the special implications of compulsory
schooling when the speech exercised is of a religious nature.
These inconsistencies raise many questions. Was the Mergens Court
straining to breathe life into an ambiguously worded and perhaps un-
workable statute enacted in the heat of the school prayer controversy?
Does the real distinction between the results reached in Hazelwood and
Mergens rest on curriculum relatedness, or is this merely a term of art
whose definition may vary from context to context? Does the distinction
between the two cases lie in the difference between sponsorship under the
Free Speech Clause and endorsement under the Establishment Clause?
Does the Free Speech Clause impose a lower threshold for sponsorship
than does the Equal Access Act? Or was the Mergens Court suggesting
that, from the perspective of the listening audience, secondary school stu-
dents are better able to distinguish government neutrality from sponsor-
ship when confronted with religious speech than when exposed to
political or other controversial speech?
The Court may be suggesting, from the view of protecting the
speaker's rights, that religious speech deserves greater constitutional pro-
130. Id. at 2372.
131. Id.
132. Id at 2382 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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tection than other forms of speech. The Court may be totally dismissing
the potential for "coercion" inherent in religious exercises in the school.
In doing so, the Mergens decision not only flies in the face of the Court's
general views of schooling and prior free speech precedent, but contra-
dicts prior case law on church and state. In fact, prior to Mergens, the
Court had struck down every instance of state-sanctioned religious ex-
pression in the public schools. 133 In all these cases, the Court had repeat-
edly expressed a fear of the coercive influence of religious expression
given the compulsory nature of schooling and the impressionability of
young students.
1 34
Is the distinguising feature here the difference between the elemen-
tary school context represented in prior cases and the specific high school
setting of Mergens? Hazelwood's broad dicta do not support that distinc-
tion. In fact, if Justice O'Connor's fears of official endorsement are su-
perimposed on the Hazelwood dicta concerning the public perception of
school sponsorship, the dangers inherent in equal access policies rise to a
level of greater constitutional concern. Given the mission and function
of public education and the values and concerns underlying the Estab-
lishment Clause, organized religious expression may deserve less consti-
tutional protection than other forms of organized speech, not more.
More fundamentally, the inconsistencies in these cases may stem
from the Court's insistence on straightjacketing free speech analysis into
the public forum doctrine. It could be that the doctrine itself is inher-
ently incompatible with the very nature of public schools as vehicles for
133. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 484 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating a statute prohibiting
public schools from teaching the theory of evolution unless accompanied by instruction in
"creation science"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating a statute requiring a
moment of silence for prayer); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (invalidating
a statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms); Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (invalidating a statute that forbade the teaching of evolu-
tion); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (invalidating Bible reading and
the recitation of the Lord's Prayer); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (invalidating daily
reading of a prayer composed by the state); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333
U.S. 203 (1948) (invalidating a "released time" program in which religious teachers provided
sectarian instruction in public schools); see generally Note, Developments in the Law: Religion
and the State," 100 HARV. L. Rnv. 1606, 1659 & n. 94 (1986).
134. In Edwards, the Court noted as follows:
The State exerts great authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance
requirements, and because of the students' emulation of teachers as role models and
the children's susceptibility to peer pressure. Furthermore, '[tihe public school is at
once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our
common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive forces
than in its schools .... '
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 584 (citation omitted) (quoting Illinois ex ret McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).
transmitting societal values. Given the broad responsibilities vested in
school officials to carry out that charge, it may prove irrelevant to apply
the doctrine's distinctions to public education in the first instance.13
Whatever the rationale for the inconsistencies, Hazelwood's concept of
sponsorship, combined with Justice Marshall's recommendations for
"disassociation," provide a more meaningful and effective conceptual
framework for protecting student rights to freedom of expression, includ-
ing religious expression, while preserving the autonomy of local officials
to govern their schools.
IV. The Road Ahead
The implications of Mergens136 for school practice are significant
and may be far-reaching. Under the Equal Access Act, once a secondary
school has opened its facilities to even one student-run group that is
neither directly tied to a particular course in the curriculum nor grants
course credit, then school officials must grant "equal access" to all the
school's resources to any philosophical, religious, or political club, re-
gardless of how controversial its mission or message. The language of
the Act limits the schools' control such that the schools may limit stu-
dent expression "to maintain order and discipline... and to protect the
well-being of students." '137 Whether this reservation of local school au-
tonomy is strong enough to prevent meetings of the Ku Klux Klan or
other hate groups remains to be seen.
The Mergens ruling may dissuade school districts from recognizing
any student-run groups in order to avoid the pitfalls of coming under the
Equal Access Act's provisions. Schools may be well advised to extend
Justice Marshall's recommendation that they "disassociate" not only
from religious expression but from all views expressed by student-run
groups that are not officially recognized as curriculum related. Such dis-
claimers would serve to protect school officials from the potential public
perception that they endorse any controversial views while preserving a
135. When we consider Mergens and Hazelwood in light of the Court's 1985 decision in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1984), perhaps Congress in
enacting the Equal Access Act incorporated from Widmar a construct-the limited open fo-
rum-that the Court has subsequently collapsed into the nonpublic forum. If so, the statutory
term itself is now out of sync with more recent constitutional developments.
136. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
137. The Act provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the author-
ity of the school, its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises,
to protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of students at
meetings is voluntary." 20 U.S.C. § 4071(f) (1989).
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climate conducive to the free exchange of ideas.138 Finally, the Court's
ruling in Mergens may throw the constitutionality of the Equal Access
Act into the state court arena because most states, by constitution or
statute, require separation of church and state. If school districts resist
the equal access concept, a considerable body of litigation may be gener-
ated throughout the state court systems.
139
Aside from these direct and practical consequences flowing from
Mergens, the views expressed by the Justices convey several broader in-
terpretive messages that ultimately may bear on educational policy and
practice, particularly in view of Justice Brennan's retirement from the
Court. The majority's adherence to a "textualist" approach to statutory
interpretation undoubtedly will lead to a narrower view of legislative
acts. Because a significant portion of education litigation is brought
under federal statutes providing educational rights and defining school
obligations, a more strict interpretation of these statutes could well lead
to a general tightening of currently recognized rights.
Beyond general interpretive approaches, Mergens may signal the
Court's willingness to grant religious speech greater protection than
other forms of speech, at least on the secondary school level. For the
Mergens majority, both the real and symbolic effects that flow from the
perception of school sponsorship of student speech are of less concern
when the speech is of a religious nature. The question remains whether
this reasoning will support the use of school facilities by outside religious
138. In Hazelwood, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, suggested
that a school may protect itself from public perceptions of sponsorship by requiring student
publications to include a disclaimer or by itself publishing a response that clarifies its own
position. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 289 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
139. In recent years, state courts have begun to emphasize the distinctive language and
history of their state constitutions as justification for interpreting them independently of the
federal constitution. Several state courts have applied this independent approach to the
church-state question. See, eg., California Teachers Assoc. v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d
953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1981) (striking down a textbook loan program); Epeldi v. Egelking,
94 Idaho 390, 488 P.2d 860 (1971) (striking down state law that authorized the transportation
of nonpublic school students); Bloom v. School Committee of Springfield, 376 Mass. 35, 379
N.E.2d 578 (1978) (striking down textbook loan program). The possibility of a state constitu-
tional violation in the equal access context was raised by the district court in Garnett v. Ren-
ton School Dist. No. 403, 675 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Wash. 1987), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1121 (9th
Cir. 1989). For a discussion of recent reliance on state constitutional law, see Brennan, The
Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual
Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986); Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law,
in 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 (1988); Tarr, Religion Under State
Constitutions, 496 ANNALS 65 (1988).
groups that do not fall under the Equal Access Act."4 This issue looms
on the Court's horizon. Based on Mergens, at least six of the Justices
probably agree that once a public school opens its facility to any commu-
nity group, it may not deny access to others based on the content of their
speech. This equal access policy is compelled by the Free Speech and
perhaps the Free Exercise Clauses, and would not contravene the Estab-
lishment Clause. Whether the Court applies Justice O'Connor's endorse-
ment test or Justice Kennedy's narrower inquiry, the results would be
identical.
V. Conclusion
Although the Mergens 1" decision appears facially to focus narrowly
on the issue of student-run religious groups, the majority's interpretive
approach and the Justices' views on the conflicting values underlying the
First Amendment may potentially bear far-reaching implications for edu-
cational policy and practice. How the Court will strike the balance be-
tween individual rights on the one side, and school autonomy and
community preferences on the other, will depend on the alliances formed
among a changing Court membership.
140. At least one federal appeals court has required a school district to open its facilities to
religious groups on the same basis established for other community groups. According to the
appeals panel, the district had created an "open forum" and could not deny access based upon
the religious content of speech. Gregoire v. Centennial School Dist., 907 F.2d 1366 (3d Cir.
1990).
141. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
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